Abstract. Despite the fact that we evidently have very good block ciphers at hand today, some fundamental questions on their security are still unsolved. One such fundamental problem is to precisely assess the security of a given block cipher with respect to linear cryptanalysis. In by far most of the cases we have to make (clearly wrong) assumptions, e.g., assume independent round-keys. Besides being unsatisfactory from a scientific perspective, the lack of fundamental understanding might have an impact on the performance of the ciphers we use. As we do not understand the security sufficiently enough, we often tend to embed a security margin -from an efficiency perspective nothing else than wasted performance. The aim of this paper is to stimulate research on these foundations of block ciphers. We do this by presenting three examples of ciphers that behave differently to what is normally assumed. Thus, on the one hand these examples serve as counter examples to common beliefs and on the other hand serve as a guideline for future work.
Introduction
IT Security plays an increasingly crucial role in everyday life and business. When talking on a mobile phone, when withdrawing money from an ATM or when buying goods over the internet, security plays a crucial role in both protecting the user and in maintaining public confidence in the system. Moreover, security techniques are often an enabler for innovative business models, e.g., iTunes and the Amazon Kindle require strong copyright protection mechanisms, or after-sale feature activation in modern cars. Virtually all modern security solutions are based on cryptographic primitives. Block ciphers are arguably the most widely used type of these primitives.
State-of-the-Art of Block Ciphers While great progress has been made in designing and analyzing block ciphers, fundamental aspects of these ciphers are still not understood.
Besides being unsatisfactory from a scientific perspective, the lack of fundamental understanding might have consequence on the performance of the ciphers we use. As we do not understand the security sufficiently, we tend to embed a security margin in the ciphers we are using. From an efficiency perspective, a security margin is nothing else than wasted performance. While for some applications this might not be critical, for others it certainly is. In particular, when it comes to cryptography in the emerging field of pervasive computing, the computational resources of the devices in question are often highly constrained, and we can only allow close to zero overhead for a security margin.
Especially for the key-scheduling algorithm, the fundamental part of a cipher that is responsible for generating key-material from a master-key to be used at several places in the algorithm (see Figure 1 for an example), simplifying assumptions are standard. While these assumptions are strictly speaking wrong, the hope is that the behaviour of the real cipher does not differ significantly from the simplified model.
Linear Cryptanalysis
One of the best known and most general applicable attacks on block ciphers is Matsui's linear attack [17] . Since its introduction many extensions and improvements have been made, and we mention a selection here. A more precise estimate for the success probability and the data complexity are given by Selçuk [22] . The effect of using more than one linear trail, referred to as linear hulls, has been introduced by Nyberg [19] ; see also Daemen and Rijmen [9] . This has been used for example by Cho [7] . Multi-dimensional linear attacks have been studied by Hermelin, Cho, and Nyberg [11] as a way to further reduce the data complexity of the basic attack. We also like to mention the critics on the concept of linear hulls by Murphy [18] ; see Leander [15] for a further discussion. One of the most recent developments is the idea to make use of unbiased linear approximations by Bogdanov et al. [4] .
However, despite its discovery more than 15 years ago, and the many extensions introduced since then some very fundamental properties are not yet well understood.
In a nutshell, for claiming a cipher secure against linear attacks, one has to demonstrate that the cipher does not possess certain statistical irregularities. In almost all cases the best we can do is to bound the correlation of a single linear trail, as this roughly corresponds to bounding the number of active Sboxes. Thus, using for example the well established wide-trail strategy used in AES [9] , obtaining strong bounds on the correlation of a single trail is quite easy nowadays. However, when it comes to bounding the correlation of a linear approximation, or linear hull to emphasize its relation to many linear trails, no general convincing arguments are available. More precisely, the task of understanding the distribution of linear correlations over the keys is unsolved.
In order to be able to do so, it is in by far most of the cases necessary to assume that all (round) keys are independently and uniformly chosen or make the even stronger (and clearly wrong) assumption that distinct linear trails are independent.
While independent round-keys are hardly ever used in any real cipher, this assumption is on the one hand needed to make the analysis feasible and on the other hand often does not seem problematic as even with the keys not independently and uniformly chosen, most ciphers (experimentally) do not behave different from the expectation.
However, those experimental confirmations that the cipher behaves as assumed are inherently insufficient. For a 128 bit block cipher a single linear approximation that for a fraction of 2 −30 of all keys has a correlation greater than 2 −30 is something that, on the one hand, we clearly want to avoid but, on the other hand, we will never discover by experiments only.
Thus, it is important to really understand the distribution of bias, where the distribution is taken over all possible keys. Only by studying the entire distribution can weak keys possibly be identified (this has been pointed out previously, cf. for example [9] ). Promising results along these lines include the work of Daemen and Rijmen [10] where the problem is clearly stated and attempts are made to give general statements. Unfortunately, as we will discuss below, one of the most general theorems is strictly speaking wrong.
Our Contribution The aim of this paper is to stimulate research on the foundations of block ciphers. We do this by presenting three examples of ciphers that behave differently to what is normally assumed. Thus, on the one hand these examples serve as counter examples to common beliefs and on the other hand serve as a guideline for future work. The value of our examples as guidelines for future work is specific for each example. The first example mainly limits the most general statements one can hope to prove, and in particular is a counter example to Theorem 22 in [10] where under rather natural conditions it was stated that the distribution of correlations is well approximated by a normal approximation and in particular one should expect many different possible values for the bias. The second example considers the influence of the key scheduling on the distribution of correlations. Here the variance (but not the shape) of the distribution significantly depends on the key-scheduling. For future work this suggests that highly non-linear key scheduling algorithms are superior to linear ones with respect to the distribution of correlations. Here highly non-linear has to be understood not as a vague criteria but in terms of minimizing the absolute values for all linear approximations. The last example is again related to key-scheduling but more so to symmetries in ciphers. We show a general equivalence of symmetries and linear approximations for weak-keys that exist for any number of rounds and illustrate this fact with an example.
The techniques used to analyze these examples are surprisingly diverse and of independent interest.
In order to facilitate the understanding of our examples without diving into too many details we give only an overview of the results of the first and the third example in Section 3. The details for the first example are postponed to Section 4 and for the third example to Section 5.
Notation and Preliminaries
Given an n bit function F : F n 2 → F n 2 , a linear approximation is an equation of the form α, x + β, F (x) = 0, where ·, · denotes an inner product. The vector α is called the input mask and β is the output mask. The bias F (α, β) ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] of a linear approximation is defined as
where the probability is taken over all inputs x. The bias is the value of major importance for linear attacks. However, due to scaling reasons, it is much more convenient to work with the correlation c
Another measure that we are going to use is the Fourier-transformation of F ,
Up to scaling F (α, β) is equivalent to the bias F (α, β) and the correlation c F (α, β). More precisely,
Linear Trails and Linear Hull Given a composite function F , i.e.,
and its correlation is defined by
It is well known, see e.g., [9] , that the correlation of a linear approximation is the sum of all correlations of linear trails starting with the same mask α and ending with the same mask β, i.e.,
In this paper we are concerned with keyed permutations, more precisely with key-alternating ciphers as defined for example in [9, Section 2.4.2] and depicted 
. The dependence of the correlation of a linear trail is conceptually very simple, only the sign of the correlation depends on the key. More precisely,
Plugging this into Equation (2) leads to the following result.
It is exactly this equation that is often referred to as the linear hull : The correlation of a linear approximation is the key-dependent signed sum of the correlation of all trails. In this work we are interested in the distribution over the keys of the linear correlation. Here one can think of each linear trail C θ as a random variable with a fixed absolute value that with probability 1/2 is positive and with probability 1/2 is negative. In this setting the linear hull is the sum of those random variables.
While in general not a lot is known about this distribution, two important characteristics can be stated, assuming independent round-keys. First, as the average of a sum of random variables is the sum of the averages, the average bias is zero. Here, independent round-keys are used to ensure that each single trail has average zero. Moreover, it is easy to see that two distinct linear trails C θ and C θ are pairwise independent. It follows (cf. Theorem 7.9.1 in [9] ) that with independent round-keys the variance of the distribution, i.e., the average square correlation, is the sum of the squares of the correlations of all trails. We summarize this in the following proposition. Proposition 1. Assuming independent round-keys, i.e., k = n(r+1) and E(k) = k, the average correlation is zero, i.e.,
Moreover, the average square correlation is given by
Finally, we already note here an observation that we will make use of later.
is linear then two distinct linear trails C θ and C θ are either independent or C θ = ±c · C θ for a constant c. More precisely C θ and C θ are independent if and only if E * (θ + θ ) = 0 where E * is the adjoint linear mapping.
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the observation that
and the general remark that a linear function (·) = a, · is either balanced (if a = 0) or constant (if a = 0). Thus two trails are independent if and only if E * (θ + θ ) = 0.
Our Results
In this section we briefly describe our examples, the results and their interpretation. As the first and the last example require more technical details for a full explanation, the exact analysis of those results and their proofs are given in later sections.
Example I: The Cube-Cipher
As a first example, we study the two round key-alternating cipher depicted in Fig. 2 with block size n, n odd. The round function x → x 3 has to be understood as a mapping on the finite field F 2 n with 2 n elements (as n is odd this is a bijection). The key consists of three independent subkeys k 0 , k 1 , k 3 each of n bits. Obviously, and for various reasons [13, Section 8.4] , this is an artificial example of a block cipher. However, for the purpose of this counterexample that does not matter -it is a counterexample anyway. Moreover, as this cipher clearly belongs to the class of key-alternating ciphers, general theorems on these have to either explicitly exclude this (and similar) examples or the statements have to cover this strange behavior as well. As we will prove in Theorem 2, the number of trails is very large. Namely roughly 2 n−2 trails with non-zero correlation exist. Furthermore, all trails have the same absolute correlation. This seems the ideal situation (we even have a parameter, n, that could go to infinity) for assuming that the distribution of correlations over the keys is very well approximated by a normal distribution, cf. Theorem 22 in [10] .
Theorem 1 (Theorem 22 of [10] ). Given a key-alternating cipher with independent round-keys. If the number of linear trails with non-zero correlation is large and the square of the correlation of each linear trail is small compared to the variance of the distribution then the distribution is well approximated by a normal distribution.
The intuition why a normal distribution should be a good approximation is that in this case the linear hull is the sum of a huge amount of pairwise(!) independent random variables. However, it turns out to be wrong. In particular, for any n, the correlation of the cipher actually takes only 5 different values. Thus, the roughly 2 n−2 random variables are not independent at all. As an example of the real distribution compared to the assumed normal distribution we consider the case n = 31 (other cases behave very similarly). Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show both distributions and make clear that the normal approximation is not a very good approximation and in particular does not get substantially better when n increases. In Section 4 we prove that in general only 5 values are obtained and we furthermore study the exact distribution of those 5 values. 
Example II: PRESENT with identical round-keys
Our second example is related to the block cipher PRESENT by Bogdanov et al., see [3] for details. As was previously shown, e.g., by Ohkuma [21] , for an increasing number of rounds PRESENT exhibits many linear trails with only one active Sbox per round. Due to the design criteria of the Sbox, it follows that all those trails have the same linear bias. Besides, those trails are the ones with a maximal correlation (in absolute terms).
It was experimentally confirmed in [21] that the distribution of the correlation nicely follows a normal-distribution with mean zero and variance 2
where N is the number of the linear trails with only one active Sbox per rounds. Thus, experimentally, we can notice two facts: Firstly, for PRESENT different trails behave like independent random variables (in contrast to the Cube-cipher) and secondly, the contribution of the non-optimal trails does not influence the distribution significantly.
Let us now come to a variant of PRESENT with identical round-keys 1 (and round-constants to avoid trivial slide attacks [1] ). As it turns out this is an intriguing example of the influence of the key-scheduling on the distribution of the correlations. We started by performing experiments on a large number of random keys and observed that the total variance of the bias distribution for some linear approximations of PRESENT with identical round-keys is consistently bigger than that of standard PRESENT for any number of rounds ≥ 5. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the linear correlation for the identical round-keys case vs. the original PRESENT key-scheduling for 17 rounds. The difference is significant in the sense that more rounds of PRESENT with identical round-keys are vulnerable to linear attacks for a non-negligible fraction of keys. In other words, in this example it is indeed the choice of the keyscheduling that makes the cipher secure or insecure against linear cryptanalysis.
To illustrate the difference consider a 20 round version. The fraction of keys with a squared bias larger than 2 −55 is 33.7% in the case of identical round-keys but only 1.1% in the case of the standard PRESENT key-scheduling.
For computing the variance of a sum of random variables it is sufficient to study the pairwise covariance of the summands. Now, as mentioned above in Lemma 1 for a linear key-scheduling algorithm there are only two possibilities for the covariance. Either two trails are independent or identical up to a constant factor. In our particular case this constant is either 1 or −1 as all trails we consider have the same absolute correlation. Note furthermore that, following Lemma 1, two trails C θ and C θ are identical (up to a constant ±1) iff E * (θ+θ ) = 0 where E denotes the key-scheduling function. For identical round-keys, we have that E(k) = (k, . . . , k) and thus
In other words two trails are identical iff the (xor) sums of all intermediate masks are identical. While in general, computing the number of trails is much more efficient than listing all trails, it is still feasible for r ≤ 20 to compute the list of trails and sort this list according to the sum of the intermediate masks.
Thus, for r ≤ 20 we can relatively easily compute the expected variance for the PRESENT-variant with identical round-keys. Table 1 shows the expected variance (Var 2 ) of the bias distribution of the optimal linear approximation for a specific one bit input and output difference. For PRESENT with identical round-keys the expected variance is very close to the observed variance (ObsVar) sampled over 20000 random keys. Table 1 also shows the expected variance of the bias distribution of the optimal linear approximation of (standard) PRESENT (Var 1 ) along with the number of trails (N 1 ) with one active Sbox per round, and the number of trails (N 2 ) where the sign depends on the keybits, for number of rounds r, 15 ≤ r ≤ 20. Table 1 . Analytical and experimental data on r-round reduced PRESENT (possibly with identical round-keys). N1 is the number of all linear trials with one active Sbox. N2 is the number of trails (among N1) that don't behave the same (their absolute values are equal but the correlation sign is different and it changes according to the subkeys). Var1 gives the expected variance of the bias of the optimal linear approximation of (standard) PRESENT, while Var2 corresponds to PRESENT with identical roundkeys. ObsVar is the experimentally observed variance sampled over 20000 random keys. It is important to note that, while the Cube-cipher is certainly an artificial design, PRESENT with identical round-keys is not. In this context we like to mention that it is precisely the behavior described here that resulted in the need to choose a different Sbox in the PRESENT-inspired sponge-based hash-function SPONGENT by Bogdanov et al. [2] . SPONGENT can be seen as a fixed key and large block size variant of PRESENT with identical round-keys.
Example III: PRINTcipher or Block Ciphers with Symmetries
It was already pointed out by Leander et al. [16] Here (cf. Section 5), we extend upon this analysis by showing an equivalence between a submatrix A of the correlation matrix that has an eigenvector with eigenvalue one and a round function that has an invariant subspace. This is crucial as this implies that this sub-matrix A, when taken to the r-th power, does not converge to the all-zero matrix. In particular in the case where there is a unique eigenvector with eigenvalue of norm 1, A r converges to a non-zero constant. This is equivalent to saying that trails with all intermediate masks determined by the invariant subspace cluster significantly for any number of rounds.
Note that an invariant subspace in particular captures, as a special case, what is usually referred to as symmetries. Thus, besides PRINTcipher one could also imagine an identical-round-key variant of AES with round constants that do not destroy the symmetries introduced by the very structured and byte oriented linear layer of AES. This example reveals two interesting points. First, in such a situation of trail clustering, increasing the number of rounds does not help and secondly without the link to invariant subspaces it seems very hard to understand why certain trails should cluster even for an AES-like design that follows the wide-trail strategy. Moreover this clustering is not inherently limited to ciphers with weak mixing (e.g., PRINTcipher), but is rather a problem for all ciphers exhibiting symmetries.
Interestingly, in a restricted sense to be discussed in Section 5, the reciprocal statement holds as well. That is, if the cipher does not exhibit symmetries, then no sub-matrices (of a certain type) have eigenvectors (of a certain type) with eigenvalue 1. Thus by avoiding symmetries one also ensures that trail clustering for any number of rounds is highly unlikely. Fig. 5 shows the difference of the distribution of the correlation for non-weak keys vs. the distribution for weak keys for a 24-bit version of PRINTcipher. Both graphs can be nicely approximated by normal distributions, however, the mean of the distribution for weak keys differ significantly from the origin. 
Example I: The Cube-Cipher
In this section we give a detailed analysis of the distribution of the correlations in the Cube-cipher 2 . We denote the block size by n, where in this example n has to be odd. First note that the initial and the final key-addition do not change the distribution. Thus, to simplify notation, we ignore them from now on. We therefore have to consider the function F k (x) = (x 3 + k) 3 . Moreover, to make the analysis easier, we focus on the input and output mask 1 ∈ F 2 n . That is, we are interested in the distribution of F k (1, 1) for varying key k.
As a first step we show that the corresponding linear hull contains a very large number of trails with non-zero correlations. More precisely, the following holds (cf. Appendix A for the proof).
Theorem 2. The number t of trails with non-zero correlation of the form
where a i are the four (complex) roots of the polynomial x 4 + x 3 + 2x + 4. Furthermore, each trail has a correlation of ±2 1−n .
The next proposition shows that, despite the huge number of non-zero trails, only 5 values occur for the correlations.
the trace mapping and note that Tr(xy) is the natural inner product on F 2 n .
Thus, we have to understand the kernel (and in particular its size) of the F 2 -linear mapping
As a polynomial, P splits nicely into factors, i.e.,
For now, we show that A 3 (x) does not have any roots. Note that this is actually enough to prove the proposition, as this upper bounds the number of elements in M by 16 = 9 + 3 + 3 + 1 and for general reasons we know that |M | = 2 i with i odd. Thus |M | ∈ {2, 8}. Assume that A 3 (x) = 0. Then
Applying the trace mapping to both sides implies Tr(1) = 0. 3 A contradiction, as n is odd.
This already demonstrates an unexpected behavior. The following theorem, proven in Appendix B, allows us to compute the exact distribution of the 5 occurring values for reasonably large n. The advantage of the above theorem is that it gives a fast way to compute the number A of k ∈ F 2 n such that F k (1, 1) = 2 n+3 . Let us further denote by B the number of k ∈ F 2 n such that
On the other hand, since knowing the number of trails with non-zero correlation together with their correlation values, corresponds to knowing the average square correlation, we have
Using the above and Theorem 2 we see that
where, as in Theorem 2, a i are the four (complex) roots of the polynomial x 4 + x 3 +2x+4. Thus using Proposition 3 and the symmetry of the distribution (which can easily be proven in this case) one can now obtain the complete distribution for how many k, F k (1, 1) obtains a particular value in {±2 (n+3)/2 , ±2 (n+1)/2 , 0} for reasonably large values of n. We give some examples below. The results in this section, especially as summarized in Theorem 5, are quite general, applying to any block cipher (permutation) exhibiting these kinds of symmetries. For this reason, we do not describe PRINTcipher in detail here, but refer to Appendix D or [12] instead. We only note here that the round-key is the same in every round (there is a small round constant).
PRINTcipher is used for experiments in Section 3.3 and below. Smallerstate versions are not formally defined but are easy to extrapolate from [12] . We use the same round constants as in the first rounds of PRINTcipher-48. A PRINTcipher-key can be split into a permutation key and an xor key.
The Invariant Subspace Let us define a subspace U ⊂ F n 2 , the orthogonal subspace U ⊥ = {y : x, y = 0, ∀x ∈ U ⊥ } and a constant d ∈ F n 2 . Then, the invariant subspace property (cf. [16] ) can be expressed as F i (U + d) = U + d. In the case of PRINTcipher, the exact definitions of U , U ⊥ , and d can be found in Appendix E. We only note that for PRINTcipher, |U + d| = 2 16 , and the trails do not involve the round constants so the invariant subspace extends to the entire cipher F , regardless of the number of rounds. However, even if an invariant subspace only occurs for some rounds of the cipher, it can certainly be interesting in linear cryptanalysis as seen below.
Understanding the Large Correlations The correlation matrix (cf. [9] ) M i = (c Fi (α, β) ) αβ collects all correlation coefficients for a single round. We are interested in the submatrix A = (a αβ ) α,β∈U ⊥ constructed through a αβ = c Fi (α, β) and its powers A r . Thus A collects the correlations where input and output masks only involve the bits that govern the invariant subspace. In any correlation matrix, the first row and column are all-zero except for c(0, 0) = 1. We extract the sub-matrix B = (a αβ ) α,β∈U ⊥ \{0} , since it will be slightly more convenient to use.
We should identify A i with F i , but the round constants do not affect A i , so all A i are equal. In particular A r A r−1 . . . A 1 = A r . Note how A r describes the contribution to the linear hull from following trails with intermediate masks in U ⊥ . More specifically, we can write Equation (3) as
where the first sum corresponds to element (α, β) of A r . If elements of A r have a large magnitude, then the corresponding elements of M r have (at least) the same magnitude, unless the contributions from trails that go outside U ⊥ (essentially) cancel those from inside.
We now examine the asymptotic behaviour of
Lemma 2. v T is an eigenvector to A with eigenvalue 1, i.e., Av T = v T .
We prove this lemma in Appendix C.1. Now, in the case where there is no other (non-trivial) eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 the sequence A r will converge (see the theorem below). This motivates the following definition. Definition 1. If the algebraic multiplicity of A's eigenvalue 1 is two and A has no other eigenvalue of absolute value 1, we say that A (or the corresponding cipher) has a stable symmetry. (The eigenvectors are that given in Lemma 2, and the vector (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) T .)
For the following theorem, we use that A has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1, the Schur decomposition of A and the relation between convergence of A r and the spectrum of A [5] .
If other contributions to c F (α, β) are negligible, then all characteristics with non-zero α,
Equivalence Between Eigenvectors and Invariant Subspaces With the following theorem, which we prove in Appendix C.2, we establish a loose relation between symmetries in block ciphers and susceptibility to linear cryptanalysis. In the case of PRINTcipher, this was a negative result, but in case of block ciphers without symmetries, it is positive.
Theorem 5.
Consider an invertible vectorial Boolean function F , a subspace U , the orthogonal subspace U ⊥ and a vector d.
Experimental Results on PRINTcipher We have implemented PRINTcipher-48 for a key from the class of weak keys used as the main example in [16] . This allowed us to derive A and verify that Av T = v T . We could also derive the biases for 16 characteristics with α, β ∈ U ⊥ . All of them were close to ±2 as suggested by the above analysis. This gives some circumstancial support to the idea that B 48 ≈ C, that this is the main contribution to c F (α, β), and that
PRINTcipher actually has a stable symmetry.
On PRINTcipher-12, we can derive B 12 analogously to above. Here the stable symmetry can then be confirmed by deriving the eigenvalues numerically for all possible matrices B 12 . Also, the convergence can be observed experimentally. Fig. 6(a) shows B 100 12 for a non-weak key, while Fig. 6(b) corresponds to a weak key. The matrices clearly differ both in terms of magnitude and structure. Furthermore convergence is rather fast, B 10 12 is already very close to the expected limit.
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented and analyzed three interesting examples of ciphers with a nonexpected distribution of correlations. The first example mainly limits the most general statements one can hope to prove. General theorems on key-alternating ciphers have to deal with this strange behavior as well.
The second example considered the influence of the key scheduling on the distribution of correlations. For future work this suggests that highly non-linear key scheduling algorithms might be preferable (cf. also [20] ). To see this consider the covariance between two different non-zero trails C θ and C θ for θ = (α, θ 1 , . . . , θ r−1 , β) and θ = (α, θ 1 , . . . , θ r−1 , β) in the case where the key-length equals the block length. Given E(k) = (E 0 (k), . . . , E r (k)) we assume furthermore that all E i are permutations and wlog E 1 (k) = k. Denoting γ = θ 1 + θ 1 , ) and E (k) = (E 2 (k), . . . , E r−1 (k)), in this setup the covariance is essentially determined by
which is nothing else than the Fourier coefficient E (γ, δ). Thus minimizing all covariances corresponds to minimizing the absolute value of E (γ, δ) which in turn corresponds exactly to maximizing the nonlinearity of E . The last example is again related to key-scheduling but more so to symmetries in ciphers. We show a general equivalence of symmetries and linear approximations for weak keys that exist for any number of rounds. This is actually a positive result as it suggests that avoiding these symmetries makes clustering of trails unlikely. Future work is needed to either make this equivalence tighter or find examples of round-independent trail clustering that does not originate from symmetries.
We hope that this work stimulates further research on this fundamental topic.
A Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The number t of trails with non-zero correlation of the form
For the ease of notation, we define
A trail
has a non-zero correlation if and only if C(1, α) = 0 and C(α, 1) = 0
We make use of the following known lemma.
Lemma 3.
Note that the equation
for any non-zero β has exactly two solutions, namely x = 0 and x = β −1/3 . Thus, we continue
which proves the lemma.
Thus the number of trails 1 → α → 1 with non-zero correlation is equal to the number of elements in the set M = {α | Tr(α −1/3 ) = 1 and Tr(α) = 1}
Note that
Therefore,
Thus, in order to compute |M | it is sufficient to study
This turns out, just as demonstrated in [14] for the inverse function, to be related to a curve. Namely, we have
The equation relating α and y gives rise to an projective algebraic curve C defined over F 2 of genus 2. The number of points N n on C defined over F 2 n can be expressed as
which implies that
Using the theory of algebraic curves over finite fields, one can obtain a closed formula for N n in terms of the eigenvalues of the Frobenius operator. Since the curve C has genus 2, these can be computed from N 1 and N 2 . It is easy to see that N 1 = N 2 = 4, which gives rise to the formula N n = 2 n + 1 − (a n 1 + a n 2 + a n 3 + a n 4 ), where a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , and a 4 are the complex roots of the polynomial x 4 + x 3 + 2x + 4. The theorem now follows.
B Proof of Theorem 3
Before we give the proof of Theorem 3 we state and prove some intermediate results.
Proposition 4. Let α ∈ F 2 n be a root of A 1 (x). Then Tr(k 3 ) = 1 + Tr(α −3 ). Moreover, A 1 (x) has exactly one root in F 2 n if and only if Tr(k 3 ) = 0. Similarly A 2 (x) has exactly one root α ∈ F 2 n if and only if Tr(k 3 ) = 1. In both cases this root satisfies Tr(α −3 ) = 1.
Proof. We only prove the statement for A 1 (x) (the statement for A 2 (x) can be shown by replacing k by k + 1 in the proof below). If α is a root of A 1 (x), then
Taking traces and using that n is odd, we obtain that Tr(k 3 ) = 1 + Tr(α −3 ). This implies the first part of the proposition and also the last statement, namely that Tr(α −3 ) = 1 for a root of A 1 (x). Now suppose that α is the only root of A 1 (x). Then the polynomial A 1 (x) factors into irreducible parts as follows
The polynomial
is irreducible if and only if the polynomial
is irreducible. However this implies that
which is equivalent to Tr(k 2 /α 2 ) = 0. As k 2 = α 2 + α −1 we conclude Tr(1 + α −3 ) = 0, which by the first part of the proposition implies that Tr(k 3 ) = 0. Conversely assume that Tr(k 3 ) = 0. Let F be the smallest extension of F 2 n containing all roots of A 1 (x). Then F contains an element α satisfying α 3 +k 2 α+ 1 = 0 and (by considering the given factorisation of A 1 (x) as above) an element β satisfying β 2 + αβ + (k + α) 2 = 0. The extension degree [F : F 2 n ] can be one (in case all roots of A 1 (x) are in F 2 n ), two (in case exactly one root of A 1 (x) is in F 2 n ) or three (in case A 1 (x) has no roots in F 2 n ). A direct computation shows that the element γ := β/α + α 3 + k 3 ∈ F is a root of the polynomial x 2 + x + k 3 + 1. However, since Tr(k 3 ) = 0, this polynomial is irreducible. We see that [F :
which implies that [F : F 2 n ] = 2. Therefore the polynomial A 1 (x) has exactly 1 root in F 2 n .
One can say more about the dependence of the roots of the polynomials A 1 (x), A 2 (x) and A 4 (x). In particular we show in the following lemma that a root of A 4 (x) gives rise to roots of A 1 (x) and A 2 (x). More precisely, we have Lemma 4. Let ξ be a root of the polynomial A 4 (x). Then ξ(ξ + k) 6 , respectively
Proof. The lemma follows by a direct computation.
We are now in the situation to give a characterization of the situation when |M | = 8.
Proposition 5. The polynomials A 1 (x), A 2 (x) and A 4 (x) together have 7 roots in F 2 n if and only if the polynomial A 4 (x) has exactly three roots. Moreover in this situation, if Tr(k 3 ) = 0 (resp. Tr(k 3 ) = 1), the polynomial A 2 (x) (resp. A 1 (x)) has three roots.
Proof. First of al note that Proposition 4 implies that A 1 (x) and A 2 (x) together can have 1 or 4 roots in F 2 n . Now assume that A 1 (x), A 2 (x) and A 4 (x) together have 7 roots. Then A 4 (x) will have at least one root. The previous lemma then implies that A 1 (x) and A 2 (x) together have at least two roots. Combining, we see that A 4 (x) has exactly three roots. Conversely, assuming A 4 (x) has exactly three roots, one obtains by a similar reasoning that A 1 (x) and A 2 (x) together have four roots. The final part of the lemma follows from Proposition 4.
The next goal is to determine for how many k ∈ F 2 n it happens that
. It is not difficult to see that half such k satisfy Tr(k 3 ) = 0, while the other half satisfies Tr(k 3 ) = 1. From now on we will assume that Tr(k 3 ) = 1 and count how many k ∈ F 2 n satisfy F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 .
Theorem 7. Given k ∈ F 2 n such that Tr(k 3 ) = 1 and F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 . Then there exists β ∈ F 2 n such that
Tr (1 + β)
Conversely, given β ∈ F 2 n satisfying Eqns. (6, 7, 8) , there exists k ∈ F 2 n satisfying Equation (5), Tr(k 3 ) = 1, and
Proof. First assume that F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 . We have seen before that a necessary condition is that |M | = 8, which implied that either A 1 (x) or A 2 (x) has three roots in F 2 n . Since Tr(k 3 ) = 1 we see using Proposition 4 that A 1 (x) has three roots. This is exactly the case if α, β ∈ F 2 n exist such that
The three roots of A 1 (x) are α (obviously) and αβ and α(β + 1). This implies
which is just Equation (5) . Define
, and x 3 = (α(β + 1)) 1/3 . These are roots of the polynomial
used to define M . It is easy to see that all other elements of M are just linear combination of x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 , i.e.
In particular
Thus, we have to compute
As A 1 (x 3 i ) = 0 it holds that
we get
as Tr(k 3 ) = 1. Thus
The conditions Tr (x i ) = 1 are, when expressed in terms of β, exactly Equations (6, 7, 8) .
Conversely assume that we are given β ∈ F 2 n satisfying Equations (6, 7, 8) . Since β ∈ F 2 n , there is exactly one k ∈ F 2 n satisfying Equation (5) . For this k we have
Also for this k, the polynomial A 1 (x) = x 3 + k 2 x + 1 has three roots in F 2 n , namely (β 2 +β) −1/3 , β(β 2 +β) −1/3 , and (β +1)(β 2 +β) −1/3 . Reasoning as above, we obtain using Equations (6, 7, 8) 
The above theorem gives an alternative way to determine for how many k ∈ F 2 n it happens that F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 . More precisely, we find
Proof. For convenience we define
As noted before, half of all k ∈ F 2 n satisfying F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 satisfy Tr(k 3 ) = 0, while the other half satiesfies Tr(k 3 ) = 1. Therefore, the corollary follows once we show that
We have already seen that there is a correspondence between β ∈ F 2 n satisfying Eqns. (6, 7, 8) and k ∈ F 2 n such that F k (1, 1) 2 = 2 n+3 and Tr(k 3 ) = 1. This correspondence is expressed by Equation (5). Given β ∈ S, there is only one k ∈ F 2 n satisfying Equation (5) , but the converse is not true. More precisely, given k, there are six possible solutions to Equation (5). Once one solutions has been fixed, say β, the other possibilities can be expressed in this β as β + 1, 1/β, (β + 1)β, 1/(β + 1), and β/(β + 1). For β ∈ F 2 n \F 2 , this gives exactly all six distinct solutions to Equation (5) . Note that 0 and 1 are not elements of S. This shows that there is a six to one correspondence between possible values of β and k, thus establishing Equation (9) .
C Proofs of Symmetry-Related Results

C.1 Proving Lemma 2
Proof (Lemma 2).
A general result states that
Applying this to the above and using the invariant subspace property, we get
and as x ∈ U and α ∈ U ⊥ it holds that α, x = 0. So we finally get
i.e., v T is an eigenvector of A, with eigenvalue 1.
In Appendix F we give a much more detailed proof, specific to PRINTcipher, where we look at how the individual bits behave: we look at how the linear approximation table of the Sbox is affected by the xor and permutation keys, and how it comes that everything adds up.
C.2 Proving Theorem 5
The "if" part follows from a straightforward generalization of Lemma 2, so we focus entirely on showing the "only if" part. For this, we need the inverse transform,
We first state a general lemma.
In a sense, what this lemma says is that if the calculation of F (x) from { F α } α∈F n 2 appears to be possible using only some subset of Fourier coefficients { F α } α∈U ⊥ , then it is. (The subset is not just any subset but a subspace.) In particular, this implies that F (y) is constant for y ∈ (U + x). The lemma follows from the Poisson summation formula [6, page 275] .
Proof (Theorem 5). Let us consider β ∈ U ⊥ , x ∈ U +d. We will study the inverse
where a β = (a βα ) is a row of A. By Lemma 5, we can conclude that β,
This holds for all x ∈ (U + d), so F −1 has the invariant subspace property. Then so does F .
D PRINTcipher
PRINTcipher (of e.g., 48 bits) is constructed as an SPN network that uses a permutation key of 32 bits and an xor key of 48 bits (so in total 80 bits of key). One round of PRINTcipher-48 is shown in Fig. 7 , where only a part of the linear layer is shown -the rest has no relevance for the property exploited in [16] or this paper. The lower part of the permutation, after the xor with a round constant, is dependent on the permutation key. Thus, what is shown here corresponds to a particular weak permutation key. 
E The invariant subspace
The relevant definitions of U , U ⊥ , and d for the class of weak PRINTcipher keys used as the main example in [16] are U = {00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** *** 00* *00 *** ***}, U ⊥ = {**0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000 **0 0** 000 000}, d = 000 010 000 000 000 010 000 000 000 010 000 000 000 010 000 000.
F A Technical, PRINTcipher-Specific Proof of Lemma 2 We consider PRINTcipher with a weak key and want to show the eigenvector property, Av T = v T . If one only wants to understand why this property arises in the general case, the proof given in Section 5 is sufficient and simpler. However, in this section, we will take a careful look at what happens inside PRINTcipher, how the individual bits interact with each other and how everything adds up. We attempt to present things from the bottom up, first looking at individual bits and Sboxes, and then gradually moving to larger structures until we reach the entire matrix A. Table 2 gives the linear approximation table of the PRINTcipher Sbox. As all interesting non-zero elements are the same in absolute terms, we will from now on give elements simply as "+" or "-". This can be done without loss of stringency when they have the same (known) absolute value and it is known how many these non-zero elements are.
We begin by introducing some definitions: S i , 0 ≤ i < 16, denotes the ith Sbox, counting from the right. A is affected by eight Sboxes, which we collect in S = S odd ∪ S even partitioned into S odd = {S 15 , S 11 , S 7 , S 3 } and S even = {S 14 , S 10 , S 6 , S 2 }. We further write S We note that we care about precisely two input and output bits for each Sbox, where the bits indexed in B odd (B even ) enter the Sboxes in S odd (S even ). Looking at the restrictions of the LAT that arise, there are only two unique such "sub-LATs". They are given in Tables 3(a) and 3(b). An active Sbox is an Sbox with a non-zero input mask. For any input mask, the Sboxes that contribute to the biased output masks are precisely the active Sboxes. The following can be readily verified:
Lemma 6. When the xor key is the all zero key, the Sboxes in S even use the partial LAT in Table 3 (a), while the Sboxes in S odd use the partial LAT in Table 3 (b). Throughout this section, α ∈ U ⊥ is implicitly assumed and r denotes the corresponding row of A, i.e., r = (a αβ ) β∈U ⊥ . (We should write e.g., r α , but prefer some sloppiness over notation overload.) α is determined by the 16 bits α n , n ∈ B (α = 2 47 α 47 + . . . + 2 4 α 4 ). We have v α = (−1) d,α = (−1) α43+α31+α19+α7 .
Lemma 7.
β |r β | = 1. More precisely, there are 2 k non-zero elements of r, each being ±2 −k , where k is the number of active Sboxes with the input mask α.
Proof. It can be seen from Tables 3(a) and 3(b) that each non-zero input mask yields precisely two different output masks. Due to this, there will arise precisely 2 k output masks with non-zero r β . As all non-zero values of the LATs have the same magnitude 2 −1 , each non-zero r β will be ±2 −k .
Let us now take the xor key into account. This will change the signs in the LATs. More explicitly, we will now be using three different LATs. They are given in Tables 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c). It is straightforward to derive the following:
Lemma 8. With a weak xor key, the Sboxes in S even use the partial LAT in Table 4 (a). The Sboxes in S outer odd use the partial LAT in Table 4 (b), while those in S inner odd use the partial LAT in Table 4 (c).
